Military Technology vs. Human Potential: Can we invest in human potential as ambitiously as we invest in military technology?

Written by:

Dario Rosić, retired Sergeant Major of the Croatian Army. After 28 years of service, he continued his career in international companies (Amazon, Maersk, NATO). Author of the initiative SPECTRA 2.0, “Strategic Concept of Civil–Military Cooperation in the Employment System.” I have led complex operational systems and transformation programmes — from command structures and missions to managing large logistics and security chains in a corporate environment. This experience of connecting people, processes and technology in international teams — both in uniform and out of it — is the foundation of the approach I advocate in this article.

Introduction

Croatia is entering a period of accelerated modernization. Rafale fighter aircraft, Leopard tanks, Caesar howitzers, counter-drone (C-UAS) systems and new transport vehicles are delivering a real leap in the capabilities of Croatia Armed Forces (CAF). This is the right direction, because without modern combat platforms, effective reconnaissance (radars, cameras, drones) and secure communications, there can be no credible deterrence or full interoperability within NATO. But, technology without people remains just inventory — the difference between “we have it” and “we can use it” is made by operators, instructors, maintenance crews, cyber specialists and a whole chain of other expert profiles. This article therefore starts from supporting equipment procurement, but raises a key question: Is it accompanied by an equally ambitious and measurable package for people? The geostrategic environment leaves us no choice: the return of high-intensity warfare, the widespread use of drones and the sharp rise in cyber-attacks all demand higher levels of expertise, faster training cycles and greater overall resilience. Our allies are already linking investment in equipment with investment in people: the United Kingdom is investing substantial resources in military housing and family welfare, the United States is systematically working on the “military – industry” transition, and France is intensifying investments in family policies and retention. Our goal should be the same, implemented through domestic solutions: housing treated as a capability, a “dual-career” approach (military career and partner’s career viewed as an interconnected system), and additional digital portals/apps to enable faster and more efficient employment of partners in businesses near garrisons and duty stations. For every planned military acquisition, a human resources (HR) module should be built in and planned from the start — how many people are needed, what profiles we need, what training must be delivered, which simulators are required, what the maintenance concept looks like and how many people it demands, as well as a retention and career-development plan in service. Pay and other forms of compensation must be transparent, and all planned benefits should support full family mobility, additional education and professional development, and take into account the real cost of living as the basis for planning. If, alongside progress in military technology, we also plan and upgrade the necessary human resources, modernization becomes a sustainable capability — not just good news in a press release, but a force we can deploy, sustain and develop.  

Military Technology

Over the past year, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (MoD) has delivered or launched historically large-scale modernization projects. On 25 April 2025, Croatia completed a squadron of 12 Rafale aircraft, symbolically closing the most important air capability project of the decade. At the same time, on 30 October 2025, the Parliamentary Defence Committee gave the green light to a €1.945 billion package: 44 Leopard 2A8 tanks, 18 Caesar Mk II howitzers, 420 TATRA trucks and a national counter-drone protection system, all of which will further enhance combat effectiveness and interoperability. Investment in military technology deserves strong support: modernization of platforms, sensors and secure communications is a prerequisite for credible deterrence and defence readiness. Today’s geostrategic picture confirms this – the war in Ukraine, the growth of asymmetric and hybrid threats in European states and the changing security environment all create an urgent need for rapid modernization of equipment and the adoption of new doctrines: capability-based planning (Capability-Based Planning, CBP), modular open architectures (interoperable with allies), procurement through shortened procedures based on urgent operational needs of units (Urgent Operational Requirements, UOR), and rapid development and validation of prototypes (Rapid Prototyping, RP). In parallel, the EU and NATO are expanding production capacities, standardisation and interoperability, while global tensions – from the Black Sea to the Indo-Pacific – demand forces that are technologically advanced, rapidly deployable and sustainable. At the same time, we are witnessing the return of high-intensity warfare, the mass employment of uncrewed systems, and an intensified tempo of cyber and information operations. This requires new capabilities, doctrine and equipment across the full spectrum of operations – but we should not forget that we also need people to plan, operate and maintain all of this. Actors that invest in modernization and procurement of military technology without investing in the attraction, retention and transition of human potential risk an overall reduction in capability, a shortage of qualified personnel and, ultimately, a strategic lag behind those countries that have developed and funded human potential in parallel with the acquisition and modernization of military equipment.

Human Potential

In the area of human resources, the most concrete step at the moment is the reintroduction of Mandatory Military service¹. On 24 October 2025, Parliament adopted the necessary legislative amendments, and the first conscripts are expected at the beginning of 2026. In parallel, voluntary military training continues and is filling up at a steady pace (the latest intake of more than two hundred recruits completed training in November), which shows that interest exists and that entry channels into the system are functioning. The financial framework has been set ambitiously: around 2% of GDP was reached in 2025, with a plan to reach 2.5% by 2027 and 3% by 2030, followed by a vision of 3.5% by 2035 plus an additional 1.5% in “related investments”. This provides a solid foundation for modernization and capability growth.  

  However, from a personnel planning perspective several potential shortcomings are visible. There is no publicly presented, coherent package of measures that would translate budget growth into stronger attraction and retention in service and, ultimately, into a predictable transition of people throughout the entire life cycle within the Armed Forces. Housing programmes and potential benefits that would directly improve everyday living standards are not being communicated sufficiently. There is no integrated plan for career development or scholarships for shortage specialties, nor have concrete “bridges” been defined between the Ministry of Defence and the defence or wider civilian industry that would ensure an effective transition of military personnel out of the system while retaining and using their knowledge and competencies in those same industries. In particular, there is no transparent timetable for pay and allowance adjustments linked to measurable criteria (operational readiness, availability, specialist skills), nor targeted training quotas for the new capabilities introduced by newly acquired or planned systems (C-UAS, cyber, maintenance of complex platforms). In conclusion, while the intake of new personnel and the fiscal plans are clear, the absence of a concrete package of measures for human potential creates a risk that modernisation will remain predominantly a technical project, without enough people to carry and develop it in the long term. This is precisely why every new capability must be matched with an appropriate, concrete and measurable plan for human potential. ^{1 Basic Military Training in the Republic of Croatia is conceived as an entry step that broadens the pool of militarily capable citizens and strengthens the reserve, while at the same time identifying potential candidates for further professional service. The programme combines core military skills (discipline, weapon handling, teamwork) with a strong emphasis on safety, physical fitness and resilience. Its key advantage is raising the overall level of security culture in society, but the challenge remains to ensure enough instructors, quality infrastructure and clear career paths for those who wish to stay in the system. In the long term, the success of BMT will be measured not only by the number of trained conscripts, but also by their motivation to remain in or return to the Armed Forces through reserve service and professional contracts.}

Allied Approaches and Solutions

Modernisation of equipment cannot deliver its full effect without the people who turn it into real capability. At the centre are C-UAS and uncrewed systems operators, as well as electronic warfare specialists: the former manage the real-time detection and neutralisation of drones, while the latter shape the electromagnetic battlespace – from jamming to protecting friendly communications. ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) analysts turn sensor data into actionable intelligence products, set targeting priorities and shorten decision-making timelines. Network and cryptographic specialists, together with cyber defence teams, ensure that command-and-control networks are available, protected and interoperable; without them, even the most modern systems cannot communicate securely. Aviation, armoured and mechanical technicians safeguard the technical reliability and safety of weapon systems throughout their life cycle. Systems and software engineers connect sensors, weapon stations and C2 (command and control) systems into a single, modular architecture aligned with NATO standards. Training planners and simulator instructors design curricula that lead from basic to advanced proficiency, while T&E (test and evaluation) teams ensure that systems deliver their declared effects under real-world conditions. The role of the NCO corps is also crucial: they pass on knowledge in units, standardise procedures and maintain discipline in the use of equipment. Logisticians and maintenance planners ensure timely supply, spare parts and configuration control – the foundation of reliability in sustained operations. Only when each of these professions (and not just the ones listed here) is backed by sufficient human potential, with clear career paths and incentive measures, does equipment move from being mere inventory to becoming operational capability. This is why developed NATO countries, alongside procurement projects for new equipment, platforms and sensors, plan and fund clear, parallel packages focused on human potential (HR): housing and everyday living and working conditions, career paths and scholarships, and career bridges to industry after the end of military service. The United Kingdom has just announced a Defence Housing Strategy worth around £9 billion to refurbish more than 40,000 military homes (in addition to earlier pay rises for 2024/25) so that recruitment and retention have real support in everyday living standards. In the United States, major technical programmes are accompanied by strong transition schemes: the DoD SkillBridge programme allows service members up to 180 days of industry internships before leaving active duty, while additional financial incentives (such as special pay for extended deployments) are targeted at retaining personnel in demanding roles. In France, under the new Defence Programming Law 2024–2030 (Loi de programmation militaire, LPM), the “Plan Famille 2” (around €750 million) and a separate retention package (around €500 million) have been launched. The measures focus on housing, childcare, easier relocations, bonuses for shortage specialties (intelligence/cyber), and adjustments to pay and pension entitlements.

Housing as a Capability

Housing should be treated as an operational capability because it directly affects whether young people decide to join the Croatian Armed Forces and stay after the first 3–5 years. Croatia already has a legal and financial framework (Regulation on Housing; Decision on the Number of Allowances) and increased housing allowances – in most duty stations around €260 net per month, with the option of organised/contracted transport when rental accommodation is not available in the place of service. This is a good start, but the effectiveness of these measures should be assessed against real rental prices in locations where key capabilities are based and where demand for personnel will be highest: Zagreb/Velika Gorica (Pleso – Rafale), Zadar/Zemunik (air force, training, uncrewed aircraft), Knin, Petrinja and Slavonia (armour/artillery), Slunj (future Caesar units?). It might be a good solution for the Ministry of Defence to compare housing allowances with local rental markets (one- and two-bedroom apartments) on a quarterly basis and automatically index the amounts in those locations where the gap is largest. In this way, the time needed to fill shortage specialties is reduced in a targeted manner and the retention rate after the first contract cycle is increased. In addition to financial allowances, a multi-year plan to modernise accommodation in priority barracks is essential: the development of quality Single Living Accommodation for unaccompanied personnel and family housing near bases, as well as a network of kindergartens and rent subsidies through partnerships with local authorities. Funding can be combined from the state budget, EU/ESIF instruments (energy renovation, digital facility management) and public–private partnerships with strict Key Point Indicators (KPIs) (tenant satisfaction, time to fix faults, occupancy). This turns current flat-rate allowances into territorially tailored retention instruments, in line with the practice of our allies. Partner experience confirms that the quality of housing and family living standards has a strong impact on recruitment and retention. The United Kingdom, as part of recent defence reviews, has increased spending on military housing and introduced centralised accommodation management (a “Forces First” approach) precisely so that retention has real support in everyday life. In the United States, oversight bodies and independent studies have repeatedly shown the link between poor barracks conditions and dissatisfaction, lower cohesion and higher attrition; better housing correlates with better mental health, higher satisfaction and a stronger intention to stay. At the European level, professional associations and think tanks warn that without addressing housing and family needs, we end up with units that are fully manned on paper, but whose personnel structure does not meet the required quality.

Dual Careers and Partner Mobility (the Family as the Key to Retention)

The decision to stay in service is rarely made by the soldier alone; in most cases, the decisive factor is the assessment/consent of the entire family. This is why a “dual-career” approach (where the military career and the partner’s career are treated as a connected system) and well-managed family mobility must become the standard, especially when moving between garrisons. Based on the experience of other countries, three broad types of solutions are possible:

Employment agreements for partners

The Ministry of Defence (MoD), together with the Croatian Employment Service (PES) and local self-government units (SGU), can conclude memoranda of understanding that include quotas for partners of members of the Croatian Armed Forces (e.g. at least 3–5% of newly opened positions). Public job competitions would include a special scoring category for the mobility of military families and proof of reassignment, while the private sector would be offered fiscal incentives (e.g. reimbursement of part of social contributions for 12 months) for hiring a partner within 90 days of the service member’s transfer. Effect: a higher likelihood that the family will accept the move, a lower risk of losing the second income, and fewer “dual households”.

Digital job-matching

One solution would be a secure digital platform (portal / app), “CAF – Family Employment”, which would connect partners of CAF members with open positions in the area around the garrison or duty station. The platform would build on the existing PES portal and use its databases and functionalities (job postings, candidate applications, location-based filtering), but add a special, tailored layer for military families. The partner would enter their qualifications and skills in a profile, while PES and local employers would post vacancies filtered by the new garrison / duty location. The platform would also offer micro-qualifications (e.g. digital skills, bookkeeping, healthcare support, logistics) with vouchers financed from the state budget or EU funds, enabling the partner to reorient to locally demanded jobs within 4–8 weeks. Effect: a shorter period of unemployment for the partner, faster integration of the family into the new community, and less psychological resistance to a change of duty station, while making better use of existing PES capabilities.

Relocation package: childcare, housing and moving costs

In addition to existing allowances, I propose introducing a one-off relocation allowance (e.g. €1,500–2,000 per move, depending on the number of dependent children) and priority access to kindergartens in municipalities around garrisons, based on agreements with local authorities. For shortage specialties (cyber, aircraft maintenance, C-UAS), an increased rent subsidy would apply during the first 12 months after reassignment. Effect: the social and financial cost of moving is reduced, and families gain a sense of predictability and security.

Why is this measure can be important for the Croatian Armed Forces?

Because it directly increases retention in critical branches and reduces unfilled posts caused by refusals of reassignment. When the partner can quickly find a job, the child gets a kindergarten place, and the costs of moving and housing are predictable, the family can realistically view the transfer as manageable. This reduces departures after the first contract, speeds up manning in the receiving unit, and saves resources that would otherwise be spent on constant cycles of recruiting and training replacements. In short: a well-designed dual-career policy turns mobility from a threat into an advantage for the system.

Career Paths and Scholarships plans

Annual intake and certification plans should be tied to concrete targets by branch, for example: 40–60 trainees in cyber security (Security Operations Center), 30–40 counter-UAS operators (C-UAS – counter-unmanned aerial systems), 60–80 aircraft maintenance technicians trained to the EASA Part-66 standard, and 40 technicians for signals and communication systems. Curricula should be designed to lead to NATO-recognised and civili­an-relevant certificates (e.g. CompTIA / CISSP for cyber, EASA for aircraft maintenance, Cisco for network technologies), with mandatory on-the-job training modules in CAF units and partner industry. Scholarships and signing bonuses should be contractually linked to 3–5 years of service after training (with proportional repayment if the obligation is broken), while for shortage specialties accelerated promotion tracks and additional readiness/operational allowances should be introduced. The programme should be implemented in a dual model (universities + vocational campuses + simulators/centres of excellence) so that the time to independent operation of complex systems is reduced from 18–24 to 9–12 months. Its effects should be measured through KPIs: time to operational proficiency, certificate pass rates, fill rates for critical posts and retention after 24/36 months — because technology only becomes real capability once it is backed by a sufficient number of certified people.

Transition Bridge “MoD/CAF to Industry” (Model, Incentives and Standards)

The transition from military service to the civilian labour market must be regulated systematically throughout the entire career, not only in the final months before discharge (as in SPECTRA²). A new transition and reskilling programme (or a redesign of the existing one) should be considered, starting at least 18–24 months before separation from service and focused on domestic defence and technology companies in areas such as C-UAS/FPV, maintenance, networks and cyber, as well as other employers interested in hiring former military personnel. Operationally, it could be run by a joint MoD–PES team with a single-entry point for candidates, a project bank in industry and digital outcome tracking (target: entry into employment no later than 90 days after leaving service). A key component would be a competence portfolio that translates military experience — logistics, security, complex systems maintenance, C2 and cyber — into civilian-readable qualifications so that employers know exactly which skills they are getting. To make this bridge truly effective, it needs to be directly linked to concrete support mechanisms. Defence procurement and public tenders should give extra evaluation points – and potentially tax relief – to employers who offer internship positions and hire military personnel or veterans under clearly defined standards. These standards should include salaries at least at the median level for the profession, mandatory mentoring and structured development plans. Success can be measured by the share of participants employed within 6 and 12 months, average salary after one year, retention in the profession, and the number of certificates obtained. In this way, internships cease to be “experience without an outcome” and become a channel into stable employment. It is also worth using state contracts as a tool for change. This can be done either by setting a minimum share of military personnel and veterans among new hires on a given project, or by giving extra points to companies that have measurable programmes for employing and retaining former service members. Such solutions are not unusual; in the United States, SkillBridge allows up to 180 days of internship before separation from service, while VEVRAA and the HIRE Vets Medallion Award encourage and recognise employers with demonstrable results. In the United Kingdom, the Armed Forces Covenant, the Employer Recognition Scheme (ERS) and the Career Transition Partnership create an ecosystem in which employers take on clear commitments and the state publicly acknowledges them – a model that can be adapted to the Croatian context through a “veteran-friendly employer” label linked to bonus points in defence procurement. For Croatia, the benefit is twofold: the “cost of exit” is reduced because there is no period of inactivity after a military career, and expertise remains in the country, flowing into the maintenance, integration and production of the very systems already used by the Croatian Armed Forces (Caesar, Leopard, C-UAS, Rafale). At the same time, the reputation of military service is strengthened – candidates join knowing there is a clear path after the uniform – and pressure is eased on units that would otherwise be constantly compensating for departures. In short, transition bridges are not a social ornament but strategic infrastructure: they turn investment in people into a lasting national capability and a competitive advantage for the defence industry. ^{1 The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia already has experience with personnel transition through the SPECTRA (Separated Personnel Care and Transition Program) initiative – a government programme for the transition and support of separated personnel. It is a comprehensive system of counselling, additional education and employer outreach that helps members of the MoD and the Croatian Armed Forces as they leave the system and develop a “second career” on the civilian labour market.}

Transparent Compensation (Predictability, Fairness and Targeted Incentives)

Publish a two-year schedule of pay adjustments by category (enlisted soldier – NCO – officer), together with clearly defined criteria for allowances: operational status, readiness, specialist skills, field and shift work, and work on high-risk equipment. Introduce pay bands for shortage specialties (cyber, Rafale/C-UAS maintenance, artillery reconnaissance / fire direction centre, Leopard/Caesar maintenance) so that pay and allowances for market-sensitive profiles are automatically adjusted. The compensation system should include an indexation mechanism (inflation / GDP) and retention bonuses linked to achieving and maintaining operational proficiency (e.g. after 12/24/36 months in post). This reduces uncertainty, makes career planning more predictable, and lowers complaints about “unfair differences” because the rules are public and measurable. Alongside pay, non-monetary benefits that directly reduce the cost of living and raise everyday quality of life are equally critical. Measures to consider include free local and intercity public transport on the home–barracks route (or a fixed annual pass), preferential home loans for a first property (subsidised interest and a guarantee fund for Croatian Armed Forces personnel), and subsidies for kindergarten and after-school care near bases and duty stations. In addition, introducing education vouchers (e.g. languages, IT certificates) and an expanded package of preventive healthcare (dentistry, sports medicals) for service members and their families would make investment in people visible beyond the workplace. These measures are not “extras without impact”: in practice they reduce refusals of reassignment, speed up return after training and increase retention after the first contract. Operationally, the compensation package should be tied to KPIs: time to operational proficiency by profile, retention after 24/36 months, manning levels in critical posts, and satisfaction with compensation in anonymous surveys. Communication must be simple and public: clear tables showing “how much, when and why”, plus an intranet calculator that displays the total package (salary + allowances + benefits). Ultimately, transparent compensation and targeted benefits are not an extra expense, but a key tool for retention, without them, equipment modernisation cannot turn into a sustainable operational capability.

Conclusion

Modernisation is necessary and well managed, but its value is ultimately measured by the number of trained, motivated and retained people behind each new platform. When housing, childcare and indexed allowances are aligned with real costs in priority duty stations, the time needed to fill posts is reduced and the percentage of personnel leaving after their first contract declines. A dual-career approach, digital job-matching and the acquisition of micro-qualifications make relocation predictable for the whole family and increase willingness to accept key assignments. Targeted career paths, scholarships and signing bonuses for shortage specialties shorten the road to operational status and close the critical skills gap. Transparent compensation and allowances based on clear rules reduce frustration and restore trust in the promotion system. The “CAF to industry” transition bridge protects the state’s investment in training and reinforces the domestic defence economy by supplying people who already know how to operate new systems. At the same time, contractual benefits and recognition for “veteran-friendly” employers help bring public policy goals into line with real labour-market practice. By introducing quarterly HR indicators — retention, time to qualification and manning of critical posts — leadership gains a tool for rapid course corrections, and the public gains a measurable view of progress. In this way, each new delivery — Rafale, Caesar, Leopard, C-UAS — is turned into a complete capability: equipment + people + training + maintenance. The message is simple and strategically important: Croatia must continue to invest decisively in equipment, but with equal intensity invest in people — because they are the only lasting multiplier of every national capability and the real guarantee that modernisation will hold in both peace and crisis. Modern platforms can be bought, but expertise, leadership and cohesion are built over years of training, care and smart career management. If we neglect that human dimension, even the best-equipped forces will fall short of their potential; if we get it right, every euro spent on technology yields a far higher return in real, deployable capability.